Governance in Social Media: A case study of the Wikipedia promotion
  process by Leskovec, Jure et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
00
4.
35
47
v1
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  2
0 A
pr
 20
10
Governance in Social Media:
A case study of the Wikipedia promotion process
Jure Leskovec
Stanford University
jure@cs.stanford.edu
Daniel Huttenlocher
Cornell University
dph@cs.cornell.edu
Jon Kleinberg
Cornell University
kleinber@cs.cornell.edu
Abstract
Social media sites are often guided by a core group of com-
mitted users engaged in various forms of governance. A cru-
cial aspect of this type of governance is deliberation, in which
such a group reaches decisions on issues of importance to the
site. Despite its crucial — though subtle — role in how a
number of prominent social media sites function, there has
been relatively little investigation of the deliberative aspects
of social media governance.
Here we explore this issue, investigating a particular deliber-
ative process that is extensive, public, and recorded: the pro-
motion of Wikipedia admins, which is determined by elec-
tions that engage committed members of the Wikipedia com-
munity. We find that the group decision-making at the heart
of this process exhibits several fundamental forms of relative
assessment. First we observe that the chance that a voter will
support a candidate is strongly dependent on the relationship
between characteristics of the voter and the candidate. Sec-
ond we investigate how both individual voter decisions and
overall election outcomes can be based on models that take
into account the sequential, public nature of the voting.
Introduction
The overall behavior of a social media site is generally
driven by the collective activity of a large population, but
in many cases these sites are also guided by a much smaller
group of core participants who are strongly committed to
the success of the site. The guidance provided by such a
core group can take many forms, ranging from assignment
of tasks in massive open-source and crowdsourcing projects,
to enforcement of explicitly articulated norms and rules on a
site like Wikipedia, to much more informal types of on-line
organizing, question-answering, and expertise location.
We think of all of these mechanisms as forms of gover-
nance, a process that plays an important role in social me-
dia, despite the fact that it is generally much more subtle
— and maintains a much lower profile — than the forms of
political, legal, and corporate governance that we are famil-
iar with in the off-line world. Governance in social media
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Figure 1: A scatter plot of the number of supporting and
opposing votes, and the outcome of each election. Elections
leading to promotion to adminship are shown in green; elec-
tions that did not lead to promotion are shown in red.
involves both deliberation (the reaching of decisions by a
core group) and also enforcement (the carrying-out of these
decisions). There has been interesting recent work on gover-
nance in social media (see e.g. Beschastnikh et al. (2008)),
but it remains a topic where there is much still to be under-
stood — particularly on the issue of deliberation, since it can
be difficult to find records of the process by which decisions
were actually reached.
The Present Work: Group Decision-Making and
Wikipedia Promotion. In this paper we consider the de-
liberative aspects of social media governance, by focusing
on a setting where detailed traces of group decision-making
by a site’s elite can be studied.
Our setting is the Wikipedia promotion process, in which
users of Wikipedia can be nominated to become admins —
a category of highly trusted user to whom special adminis-
trative privileges are granted. The promotion process has a
clearly defined formal structure: the candidate for admin-
ship submits a case for promotion; there is then a period
of discussion and deliberation by the community; and this
is followed by a vote. There are two important features of
this process that are worth noting. First, any Wikipedia user
is allowed to vote, not just users who have achieved admin
status (although the contents and results of the voting are in-
terpreted by a special class of admins called bureaucrats in
order to reach a final decision). Second, and crucial for our
research purposes, the discussion and voting is carried out
completely in public, and is recorded as part of Wikipedia,
so that a transcript is subsequently available. As a very sim-
ple illustration to give a sense for the dataset, Figure 1 shows
a scatter-plot of the number of positive and negative votes in
each Wikipedia promotion election. We describe the dataset
in much more detail in a subsequent section.
The Wikipedia promotion process thus has the key ingre-
dients we need: it is a deliberative process carried out by
core, committed members of a social-media community; it
has the goal of producing a single group decision; and it
is publicly recorded, making the analysis possible. It also
serves as an instance of a broad type of decision-making, fa-
miliar from the off-line world as well as the on-line world, in
which people are asked to offer evaluations of other people.
Wikipedia promotion was studied recently by Burke and
Kraut (2008); their focus was on considering the process
from the perspective of candidates for adminship, using
properties of the candidates to develop statistical models
capturing their likelihoods of promotion. In contrast, be-
cause of our interest in the issue of deliberation, we study the
process from the perspective of the voters: we ask how vot-
ers evaluate candidates, how a single voter behaves across
many different elections, and how voting unfolds over time
as an election of a single candidate is carried out in public.
The Present Work: Main Results. Our main findings can
be viewed as identifying ways in which a voter’s evaluation
of an admin candidate reflects different types of relative as-
sessments — based on the relation of the voter to the candi-
date, and to the (public) decisions of other voters.
We begin by analyzing how the relationship between char-
acteristics of a voter V and a candidateC affect V ’s decision
to vote positively or negatively. We find that the probability
V will vote positively on C is strongly dependent on the rel-
ative values of several basic “figures of merit” for C and V ;
these include which of C or V has a greater number of edits,
and which has a greater number of barnstars, awards given
by other members of Wikipedia (Kriplean et al. 2008).1 The
extent to which C and V have interacted in the past also has
a significant effect on the likelihood that V will vote posi-
tively on C. Overall, this analysis suggests that one should
think of the likelihood of a positive vote on a candidate not
as a function of just the candidate alone, but as a function of
both the candidate and the voter.
We then consider the relationship between a voter V ’s de-
cision and the public decisions of other voters expressed ear-
lier in the election. To make this precise, we show how to
compute a response function for V , giving the probability
that V will vote positively as a function of the fraction of
1Here is the definition of a barnstar from Wikipedia: It is the
custom to reward Wikipedia contributors for hard work and due
diligence by awarding them a barnstar. To give the award to some-
one, just place the image on their talk page (or their awards page),
and say why you have given it to them. Wiki barnstars were intro-
duced to Wikipedia in December 2003. Since then, the concept has
become ingrained in the Wikipedia culture. These awards are part
of the Kindness Campaign and are meant to promote civility and
WikiLove. They are a form of warm fuzzy: they are free to give and
they bring joy to the recipient.
preceding votes that were positive. A non-trivial number of
Wikipedia editors have each voted in several hundred elec-
tions, making reliable estimates of their individual response
functions possible. We find a striking level of diversity in
the response functions of these very frequent voters: some
of them are very stingy with their positive votes, while others
are much freer. These findings raise an intriguing possibil-
ity that transcends the particular definition of response func-
tions and addresses the broader issue of aggregation in social
data; it suggests that when we observe cumulative curves
showing how members of a population respond in aggregate
to the behavior of others (e.g. the types of social influence
analyses found in Backstrom et al. (2006), Kossinets and
Watts (2006), and Leskovec et al. (2006)), it may be that
these aggregate functions are not typical of any particular
individual, but instead represent averages over populations
that are highly heterogeneous.
Understanding the relationship among different voters’
decisions involves the consideration of how a single elec-
tion’s dynamics play out over time, as votes are cast pub-
licly in sequence. We explore this issue further, ask-
ing how these dynamics affect the overall outcome of the
election — i.e., whether the group decision is positive or
negative. This is the setting of fundamental models for
information cascades in economic theory (Banerjee 1992;
Bikhchandani et al. 1992), and as such it is interesting to see
how the dynamics reflected in the real data compare to the
predictions of these models. We find that the probability of
an election’s success depends heavily on the outcomes of the
first few votes — primarily, one expects, because these first
few votes provide powerful evidence for the strength of the
promotion case. However, with a few structured exceptions
that we identify, we do not find strong evidence that the or-
der in which a given set of initial positive and negative votes
are interleaved has a significant effect on the outcome. This
forms an interesting contrast with predictions of “herding”
behavior, in which it is argued that a few concurring votes at
the outset of a sequential voting process can induce subse-
quent conformity.
Related Work
As discussed in the introduction, governance in social media
includes both deliberation and enforcement. The issue of en-
forcement, which is distinct from our investigation here, has
been the focus of a line of work in human-computer inter-
action, addressing issues such as how the development and
application of norms can help control deviant behavior in
on-line communities (see e.g. Cosley et al. (2005) and the
references therein).
In the study of deliberation, there have been recent in-
vestigations of on-line settings in which public opinions are
expressed sequentially, as they are in Wikipedia promotion
as well. Wu and Huberman (2008) study the sequences of
reviews for a product on Amazon, and Danescu-Niculescu-
Mizil et al. (2009) study the question of how the helpfulness
of such reviews are evaluated by Amazon’s user community.
In a related vein, Lerman (2008) studies the patterns of vot-
ing for news stories on Digg, identifying patterns that help
predict whether a story will become highly popular.
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Figure 2: Final fraction of support votes for elections that
resulted in promotion and those that did not.
Finally, as noted in the introduction, Burke and Kraut
(2008) have previously studied the Wikipedia promotion
process, but focusing on the characteristics of candidates
rather than on voters as we do here; they analyze textual
features describing contributions and user activity to build
classifies for predicting adminship election outcomes.
Dataset description
In Wikipedia any user can be nominated for promotion to
adminship. When a candidate is considered for a promotion
there is a public discussion and vote. Each vote is signed
by the user who produced it, and votes are generally accom-
panied by some explanatory text written by the voter. Af-
ter the election the record and all the votes are kept in the
Wikipedia archives. We collected data on all the elections in
the English part of Wikipedia between September 17, 2004
and January 6, 2008, which gave us a set of 2,794 elections.
Votes can be cast in one of three categories: support, op-
pose and neutral. In our dataset there is a total of 114,040
votes: 83,962 support, 23,118 oppose and 6,960 neutral.
This yields a baseline probability of a support vote of 0.784.
Each vote can get discussed or commented on by other users
and thus rich discussions can develop. Overall 7% of sup-
port votes got discussed, while 82% of the oppose votes
were commented on or further discussed.
When a candidate is considered for promotion, after about
a week-long voting period a Wikipedia bureaucrat in charge
of overseing the election decides whether the nomination for
promotion was successful. The bureaucrat makes this deci-
sion based on a consensus of voting users. Overall 1,248
(44.6%) elections resulted in successful promotion. In suc-
cessful elections (i.e., those that resulted in promotion) on
average there were 52.2 support, 1.5 neutral and 3.1 op-
pose votes. On average successful elections concluded with
94.7% of all votes supporting the promotion. For failed elec-
tions there were on average 12.5 oppose, 3.3 neutral and 11.9
support votes, and these elections closed with an average of
31% of the votes supporting the promotion. Figure 2 plots
the histogram of final fraction of support votes for successful
and failed elections.
In principle, any registered Wikipedia user can cast a vote.
However a very small fraction them actually do so. 8,298
distinct users participated in elections either as voters (7,499
users) and/or candidates (2,539 users). Notice the number
User type N fv ps
Administrators 1,235 44% 0.794
Unsuccessful candidates 1,304 12% 0.748
Other users (voters) 5,759 44% 0.783
Table 1: User statistics. N : number of users, fv: fraction of
votes casted, ps: probability of a support vote.
of candidates is smaller than the number of elections as a
single candidate can go up for election multiple times until
he or she is elected. Table 1 gives statistics about the user
population, which we split into the following three disjoint
classes:
• Administrators are users for which some election turned
out successful.
• Unsuccessful candidates are users who went up for pro-
motion but the election(s) turned out unsuccessfully.
• Other users are editors that only cast votes but were never
considered for promotion to adminiship.
For the analyses described in the remainder of the paper
we discarded all neutral votes and consider only elections
with at least 10 votes. In a small number of cases when a
user changed her mind and recast the vote, we consider the
last vote cast by that user as the vote.
Relative Merit of Candidates and Voters
We begin by considering properties of a voter V and a candi-
date C that affect V ’s decision on whether to vote positively
or negatively on C.
To provide some context for this, recall that Burke and
Kraut (2008) analyzed the success of a Wikipedia promo-
tion candidate C based on characteristics exhibited by C.
Their work leaves open two qualitatively distinct possibili-
ties. First, it may be that the probability that C receives a
positive vote is a function primarily of C’s attributes alone
— in other words, there are certain criteria for a person to
become an admin (i.e., a certain number of edits, a certain
number of barnstars, and so forth), and the decision of any
voter is mainly an application of these common criteria. Al-
ternately, it may instead be that the probability of C receiv-
ing a positive vote depends in a significant way on the rela-
tionship between characteristics of C and characteristics of
the voter V who casts the vote. In other words, we may want
to model voter V as performing a relative assessment of C
through implicit (even if not overt) comparison to V ’s own
merit. This latter possibility is particularly intriguing, given
several recent lines of work suggesting the importance of rel-
ative comparisons between an individual and a peer group,
in contrast to absolute evaluations of merit (Burt 2009;
Leskovec et al. 2010).
We approach this question by computing univariate mea-
sures derived from differences in merit between C and
V ; this allows us to identify one-dimensional relationships
based on these differences. As we now show, there is strong
evidence that such measures of relative merit between C and
V play a significant role in the empirical probability that V
votes positively on C.
Relative Merit. In our analysis of relative merit, we will
be interested in the positive-vote fraction: the overall frac-
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Figure 3: Probability of V voting positively on C given the
difference in merit between V and C. (a) Difference in the
number of edits between V and C. (b) Difference in the
number of barnstars.
tion of positive votes received by candidates from voters,
restricted to different sub-populations of the candidates and
voters. We consider ways of evaluating a candidate C rela-
tive to a voter V based on different figures of merit. We be-
gin with the number of edits to articles, which can be taken
as a basic measure of the total activity (and hence, in some
sense, contributions) on Wikipedia.
In Figure 3(a), we show the probability that a voter V will
support a candidate C as a function of the signed logarithm
(sign(x) · log10(|x|)) of the difference in the number of edits
they’ve each made. (Thus a negative value means that V has
made fewer edits than C, while a positive value means that
V has made more edits than C, and these differences appear
on the x-axis on a logarithmic scale.) We observe several
important features of this plot. First, it is significantly higher
to the left of 0 (when candidate C has more edits) than it is
to the right of 0 (when voter V has more edits). This is
the most basic indication that the relative merit of V and C
is playing a role. Moreover, the effect on the positive-vote
fraction is significant over multiple orders of magnitude in
the difference of edit counts.
Non-Monotonic Effects of Relative Merit. There is a fur-
ther striking point to note about Figure 3(a): not only is
there a drop in the positive-vote fraction as we move from
negative log-differences to positive ones, but there is also a
“rebound” in which the positive vote fraction climbs again
once the log-difference exceeds 1. (The error bars indicate
that this effect is significant.) This means that, in aggregate,
voters are least likely to support candidates who have edit
counts that are approximately the same as their own. Note
that even though there is a rebound when V has higher edit
count than C, the probability of V voting positively is still
below the baseline.
In Figure 3(b) we perform the same analysis for a differ-
ent relative figure of merit: the difference between the num-
ber of barnstars received by the candidate C and the voter
V . (Again, a negative difference means that the candidate
has more barnstars than the voter.) The shape of the curve is
surprisingly similar, given that the measure of merit is quite
different; again we see the drop from negative differences
to positive ones, and the same non-monotonicity around 0.
There is an additional interesting feature in Figure 3(b): the
single biggest change in the positive-vote fraction occurs
when we move from negative barnstar differences to non-
negative barnstar differences. This suggests that in analyz-
ing relative merit based on barnstars, the sign of the differ-
ence — i.e. the simple contrast between whether the voter
has more barnstars than the candidate or fewer — is more
salient that the actual numerical value of the difference.
The non-monotonicity around 0, and the fact that it shows
up so significantly in both curves, suggests some intrigu-
ing conjectures about relative merit. In particular, it sug-
gests that voters are particularly critical of candidates whose
level of achievement is comparable to their own — a contrast
with the simpler (and incorrect) hypothesis that the support
of voters for candidates should be purely monotonic in this
relative level of achievement. Such a conjecture forms an
interesting connection to the recent lines of research in so-
cial networks mentioned earlier, studying the roles played
by relative assessments in comparison to a peer group.
Direct Voter-Candidate Interactions. Finally, we consider
an even more direct kind of relationship between a candidate
C and a voter V : the extent to which C and V communi-
cated prior to the election. We use edits that C and V made
to each other’s user-talk pages on Wikipedia as the trace data
for the history of communication between them.
Figure 4 examines this by plotting the probability of a
support vote versus the number of talk-page edits between
the candidate and the voter (Figure 4(a)) and the total num-
ber of words exchanged by the voter and the candidate on
their respective talk pages (Figure 4(b)). We see that there
is a clear upward effect in which the probability that V will
vote positively on C tends to increase with the amount of
direct communication that the two have had. Figure 4(a)
in particular indicates that the simple existence or non-
existence of prior communication between C and V has a
large effect on the probability of a positive vote.
Thresholds and Diversity in Voter Behavior
So far we examined how voters make decisions by compar-
ing the candidate to themselves. Now, we examine how vot-
ers evaluate the candidate in the context of previous votes in
the election. We explore how voters make decisions in the
context of a specific election, as it unfolds over time and in
public. In this context we are interested in threshold-based
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Figure 4: Probability of V voting positively on C given
the number of talk interactions and the total number of ex-
changed words between V and C.
models that characterize changes in voter behavior based on
the current state of the election. Our investigation addresses
two basic issues: the relevance of threshold-based models,
and the diversity of thresholds across different voters.
Threshold-Based Analysis of Voting Behavior. The first
issue is the relevance of threshold-based models in analyz-
ing how voters behave in an election. For any vote cast in
any election, we can define its positive precedent to be the
fraction of positive votes in the election up to that moment.
(In other words, if a vote was cast in an election at a mo-
ment when the current vote count was 16 in favor and 4
against, then the positive precedent of that vote would be
16/(16 + 4) = 0.8.) Now, we define a response function
f(x) as follows: over all votes with a positive precedent of
x, we set f(x) equal to the fraction that were positive.
The fact that the elections are carried out sequentially in
public forms the motivation for this function: it is possible
for a voter to know the current fraction of positive votes (i.e.
the positive precedent) at the moment she casts her vote. If,
for example, each voter flipped a coin with bias equal to the
current fraction of positive votes, and used this as her vote,
then we would see a response function f(x) ≈ x. The extent
to which a plot of f(x) deviates from the line y = x can thus
be taken as evidence of a deviation from this baseline.
In Figure 5, we show a plot of the function f(x), com-
pared to the diagonal line y = x. We see that f(x) > x
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Figure 5: Response function f(x), and also aggregated sep-
arately over the sub-populations of admins and non-admins.
for small values of x (up to about 0.3) and f(x) < x for
larger values of x (above 0.3, with the effect becoming par-
ticularly pronounced above 0.6). This is consistent with re-
cent theories of sequential expressions of opinion in on-line
settings (Wu and Huberman 2008); these theories argue that
such deviations represent a tendency for users to be more
motivated to express an opinion when it goes against the
prevailing outcome. In this case, the argument would be that
users who view a candidate positively would be particularly
motivated to cast a positive vote (rather than simply not to
vote at all) if they see that the fraction of positive votes is
particularly low. The corresponding reasoning concerning
negative opinions would support the observed downward de-
viation of f(x) at larger values of x.
Figure 5 also shows plots of f(x) aggregated over the sub-
populations of admins and non-admins. (Non-admins are
Unsucessful-candidates and Other users.) This partition of
the full population is a useful one in a number of our anal-
yses in this section: although any Wikipedia user is allowed
to vote in a promotion election, the admins are the ones
who have successfully passed through the promotion pro-
cess themselves, and they are the ones most overtly charged
with ensuring that Wikipedia functions effectively. Thus,
this division into the two sub-populations provides us with a
way to separately study the users who are most invested in
the outcome of the process and the users who are participat-
ing in the process but less invested. In the plot, we find that
when x is small, f(x) ≈ x holds more closely in the admin
population than in the non-admin population; non-admins
in aggregate appear to be significantly more generous with
their positive votes in elections where the positive-vote frac-
tion is low. At large values of x, the two sub-populations
agree very closely.
Diversity of Individual Response Functions. Just as we
defined a function f(x) for the whole population, we can de-
fine a personal response function fi(x) for each voter i. We
define fi(x) to be simply the analogue of f(x) applied only
the votes of voter i: over all votes with a positive precedent
of x that were cast by i, we set fi(x) equal to the fraction
that were positive.
The natural worry in defining such a function is that there
will not be enough data on any individual i to be able to
meaningfully estimate fi(x). But on Wikipedia, there are
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Figure 8: 78 voters that participated in more than 200 elections. We take all their participation and only first and only second
half of elections they participate in.
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  20  40  60  80  100
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f v
ot
in
g 
po
sit
iv
el
y
Fraction of support votes at time of vote
Figure 6: Personal response functions for 11 users that voted
on more than 400 elections.
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Figure 7: Response functions of admins (green) vs. non-
admins (red). Notice large variations in each sub-population.
close to a hundred users who have voted in more than 200
elections, and for these users we can reasonably estimate
fi(x) with x rounded to the nearest multiple of 0.1.
Figure 6 plots the estimated personal response functions
fi(x) for the 11 users who each voted in more than 400
elections, and Figure 7 plots the estimated personal response
functions for the 28 users who each voted in more than 300
elections. What is immediately striking is the considerable
diversity in the shapes that these functions take. Some users
tend to vote overwhelmingly negatively whenever the cur-
rent fraction of positive votes is below 70%, while others
are likely to vote positively even when most votes thus far
in the election have been negative. The comparison of this
diversity with the approximately diagonal shape of the cu-
mulative function f(x) suggests that f(x) represents in ag-
gregate, over the whole population, what is in reality an av-
eraging of a highly diverse set of individual response func-
tions. This is an important issue to bear in mind whenever
we study such population aggregates; what is unusual in this
case is that we have a non-trivial collection of individuals
with sufficiently extensive personal histories in the system
that we can actually build curves for each of their individual
patterns of behavior.
In Figure 7, we also average separately over the admin
and non-admin sub-populations of this group of extremely
frequent voters. The fact that the admin curve is uniformly
lower than the non-admin curve is consistent with the more
conservative approach to voting — in aggregate — that we
saw for the admin sub-population in Figure 5 as well.
Finally, given the extensive personal histories of 78 users
who have voted in over 200 elections each, we can study
how their voting behavior evolves over time, by looking at a
voter i’s personal response function f (1)
i
(x) built only over
the first half of the elections that i participated in (in chrono-
logical order), and the function f (2)
i
(x) built only over the
second half of the elections that i participated in. We find
(in Figure 8) a general tendency for voters to become more
conservative in their use of positive votes over time, and par-
ticularly for non-admins: the population average of f (2)
i
(x)
over the non-admins in this group is clearly lower than the
population average of f (1)
i
(x) over this group. For the ad-
mins, on the other hand, the population averages of these
two functions are more similar, indicating a kind of aggre-
gate stability in the voting behavior of frequently voting ad-
mins as they “grow older” in Wikipedia.
Timing of Entry. A further issue is when, over the sequence
of votes in an election, different voters tend to arrive to cast
their votes. For a given voter, the timing of one’s arrival
affects how much information one has about earlier votes,
which may in turn affect one’s own vote.
In Figure 9, we show when different sub-populations of
voters tend to cast their votes, relative to the overall popu-
lation average. We find much less difference between the
admin and non-admin population (panel (a)) than we do
between the populations of frequent and infrequent voters
(panel (b)); in this latter case, frequent voters tend to cast
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Figure 9: (a) Time when admins and non-admins cast their
votes. (b) Time when heavy and non-heavy voters cast votes.
their votes earlier in the election than non-frequent voters
do. Interestingly, however, we do not find any significant
dependence between the time at which a voter casts her vote
and the positive/negative value of that vote.
Dynamics of Elections over Time
In the previous section, we considered how the aggregate
dynamics of an election over time affected the decision of
a particular voter at the time that he or she arrived to cast a
vote. We now examine the same process at much finer reso-
lution. We consider how the fine grained temporal dynamics
of votes affects the overall election outcome — namely, we
study how vote order affects the election outcome. Our main
finding is that the temporal order of votes — taking the fi-
nal tally as given — does not have a significant effect on the
outcome, with a few exceptions that we note below.
The History of an Election. We make these question pre-
cise as follows. Consider an election e, and let pe and ne
be the total number of positive and negative votes, respec-
tively, that were cast in election e. The full record of a pub-
lic election with sequential voting also includes the order in
which the votes were cast; we define pe(j) and ne(j) to be
the number of positive and negative votes in election e up
through the point at which j votes in total had been cast.
We define the history of the election e to be the sequence
of points {(ne(j), pe(j)) : j = 0, 1, 2, . . . , length(e)}, and
we define the running fraction of positive votes to be the
sequence of fractions {pe(j)/j : j = 1, 2, 3, . . .}. Fig-
ure 10(a) provides a visual representation of the histories of
all elections; each history is a sequence of two-dimensional
points leading from origin at (0, 0) to the final tally (ne, pe).
We begin with some basic initial observations about the
histories of the elections in our dataset. First, as shown in
Figure 10(b), the Wikipedia bureaucrats who regulate the
election process tend to end very negative elections early, so
that elections with long histories (of about 40 votes or more)
tend to be the more successful ones. Second, we find that
unsuccessful elections tend to be “top-heavy” with an over-
representation of positive votes early, and an overrepresenta-
tion of negative votes later. Figure 10(c) provides an analysis
of this: in an unsuccessful election, the running fraction of
positive votes declines over time, down to the randomized
baseline one gets by randomly permuting the order of the
votes. Successful elections, on the other hand, exhibit a rel-
atively stable running fraction of positive votes; it resembles
the running fraction one would get even if the order of the
votes were randomly permuted. One conjecture is that in
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Figure 12: Average fraction of support votes in the election
as a function of the index of the first oppose vote.
unsuccessful elections, a candidate’s close supporters vote
early, leading to an elevated fraction of positive votes, but
this then declines as a broader set of voters arrives.
The Prefix of an Election’s History. We also consider the
specific effect of the very first few votes in an election’s
history. Figure 11 shows a tree of all possible prefixes of
lengths 1, 2, 3 that an election’s history can have, and gives
the total number of elections and the number of successful
elections for each such prefix. Considering the prefixes that
each contain the same number of positive and negative votes
reveals an interesting pattern.
When considering the length-2 prefixes with a 1:1 tally
we see that (support,oppose) produces elections with a
considerably lower rate of success, 0.127, than for (op-
pose,support), which has a success rate of of 0.192, even
though the vote count is the same at the end of these two
prefixes. For length-3 prefixes, there are three patterns
with the tally 2:1 and three patterns with the tally 1:2. In
each of these cases, the two patterns that do not start with
(support,oppose) have essentially the same success rates
as one another whereas the pattern that starts with (sup-
port,oppose) has a lower success rate. For example, the pre-
fixes (support,support,oppose) and (oppose,support,support)
have rates of 0.328 and 0.323 respectively, whereas (sup-
port,oppose,support) has a considerably lower rate of 0.277.
The discrepancy between these cases can be taken as
a further reflection of the idea from Figure 10(c), that
in unsuccessful elections, a candidate’s close support-
ers tend to vote early. This discrepancy also forms
an interesting contrast with results in economic theory
suggesting that initial positive votes can induce “herd-
ing,” elevating the probability of success (Banerjee 1992;
Bikhchandani et al. 1992). The difference between (sup-
port,oppose) and (oppose,support) shows the opposite con-
trast in our case, due to the selection effects of a candidate’s
endorsers voting early.
Finally, we ask whether, in an election where support is
very strong, the timing of a single early negative vote can
have a significant effect. As shown in Figure 12, it does not:
in elections where the tally after the first 8 votes is 7 positive
and 1 negative (panel (a)), and in elections where the tally
after the first 15 votes is 14 positive and 1 negative (panel
(b)), the position in which the one negative vote occurs has
essentially no effect on the probability of a successful over-
all outcome. This again reflects the ways in which timing
effects appear to be more noticeable in unsuccessful elec-
tions than successful ones.
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Figure 10: (a) Progression of the election over time. Each election is a trail of support and oppose votes. (b) Probability that election
results in promotion as a function of the number of votes. (c) Current fraction of positive votes as a function of time for failed and successful
elections. Successful elections remain positive over time, while in negative elections the fraction of positive votes decreases over time.
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Figure 11: Election tree. Notice that the order is not important but only the number of positive/negative votes.
Conclusion
As a case study of social-media governance, we have investi-
gated the Wikipedia promotion process from the perspective
of the voters engaged in group decision-making. We have
identified several forms of relative assessment that play an
important role in how voters make decisions; these include
how relative characteristics of voters and candidates affect
the probability of positive votes, as well as how voters’ deci-
sions depend on the state of the election at the time they cast
their votes. We have also investigated the temporal dynam-
ics of the elections, identifying ordering effects that contrast
with standard theories of herding and information cascades.
This style of analysis suggests a range of further inter-
esting questions related to governance and deliberation. It
would be interesting to connect our findings on the rela-
tive merit of voters and candidates more closely to the re-
cent work of Burt (2009) and others on the role that rela-
tive comparison plays in social networks. We would also
like to try integrating our analyses of temporal dynamics
in elections with Bayesian models of information cascades
(Banerjee 1992). Finally, we believe that the style of anal-
ysis used here could be productively combined with textual
analysis of the content of discussions that arise as part of de-
liberation on social-media sites; such a hybrid of textual and
structural approaches could well yield further insights.
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